Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

State of Utah v. Dustin Marshall : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kris Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellee.
Walter F. Bugden; Tara L. Isaacson; Budgen and Isaacson, l.l.c; Elizabeth Hunt; Attorneys for
appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v. Marshall, No. 20030868 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4598

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Appellate Case No. 20030868-CA
vs.
DUSTIN MARSHALL,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This is an appeal from one conviction of equity skimming, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-522, and four convictions of
acting in capacity without a license when required, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-201, entered in the
Eight Judicial District Court for Uintah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge, presiding.
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
DOCKET NO. ^0

^OWft^fr

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. (480)
TARA L. ISAACSON (7555)
BUGDEN & ISAACSON, L L C .
623 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801)476-1700
Facsimile: (801)467-1800

Kris Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

ELIZABETH HUNT (5292)
569 Browning Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801)461-4300

Attorneys for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Appellate Case No. 20030868-CA
vs.
DUSTIN MARSHALL,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This is an appeal from one conviction of equity skimming, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-522, and four convictions of
acting in capacity without a license when required, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-201, entered in the
Eight Judicial District Court for Uintah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, Judge, presiding.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. (480)
TARA L. ISAACSON (7555)
BUGDEN & ISAACSON, L L C .
623 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801)476-1700
Facsimile: (801)467-1800
Kris Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

ELIZABETH HUNT (5292)
569 Browning Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801)461-4300

Attorneys for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ADDENDUM

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

ARGUMENT

1

I.

REVERSAL OF THE EQUITY SKIMMING CONVICTION IS
REQUIRED BECAUSE THE VERDICT WAS PREMISED ON A
TRANSACTION SPECIFICALLY ABANDONED BY THE
PROSECUTOR AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING AND THAT
WAS NOT BOUND OVER AFTER THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
1

II.

REVERSAL IS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL

7

A. Joinder of Cases

7

1. Not a Conscious Strategy

7

2. Objectively Unreasonable Assistance

8

3. Prejudice

9

B. Failing to Cross-Examine Abplanalp on Prior Inconsistent
Statements
10

III.

C. Odometer Fraud

16

D. Payoff Authorization Form

18

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRES REVERSAL

20

CONCLUSION

24

i

ADDENDUM
Page
A.

Two Jury Instructions

26

B.

Final Verdict

29

C.

P. 19 of R 132 (Preliminary Hearing)

30

D.

62 Trial

31

E.

76 Trial

32

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980)

3-4

State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 1989)

7

State v. Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1943)

1

State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 P. 1085,1086 (1908)

4

State v. Nelson, 176 P. 860, 861 (Utah 1918)
State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1139 (Utah 1988)

4, 7
2,4,7

Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company v. Smith, 2002 UT 49,1J 5,48 P.3d 976
6
State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985)

1

State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986)

1

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984)

23

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-1

8, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401

9

Rules
Ut. R. Crim. P. 9.5

8

:

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Appellate Case No. 20030868-CA

vs.
DUSTIN MARSHALL,
Defendant/Appellant.

ARGUMENT
I.

REVERSAL OF THE EQUITY SKIMMING CONVICTION IS REQUIRED
BECAUSE THE VERDICT WAS PREMISED ON A TRANSACTION
SPECIFICALLY ABANDONED BY THE PROSECUTOR AT THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING AND THAT WAS NOT BOUND OVER AFTER
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING.
Marshall contends he was tried and convicted of equity skimming arising

out of a criminal episode for which he was not bound over by the magistrate. As
a result, Marshall was denied the protections of a preliminary hearing on the
transaction involving the sale of the Chevy S-10 pick-up on July 19, 2002, the
only transaction for which he was convicted. The variance between the evidence
and arguments of the State at the preliminary hearing and the evidence and
arguments of the State at the trial is not insignificant. See generally, Opening
Brief of Appellant, Point I. State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986); State v.
Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985); and State v. Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52

1

(1943) ("defendant cannot be convicted of a crime for which he was not given or
for which he did not waive a preliminary hearing.")
The State concedes that jurisdictional errors may be raised at any time.
State's Brief at 9. However, the State asserts the variance in proof is cured
because the Information alleged a range of dates from "on or between July 19 to
October, 2002;" and therefore, the Defendant received a preliminary hearing for
the July 19th transaction. State's brief at 11-12. This argument must fail since it
flatly ignores that the prosecutor abandoned the July 19th transaction before the
magistrate bound over the Defendant to the District Court. The continuous
conduct argument advanced on appeal, if accepted by this Court, would allow the
State to put the Defendant and magistrate on notice of a particular transaction
(the sale of the Monte Carlo to the Fausetts) to obtain a bind over at the
preliminary hearing, but then switch and revive the abandoned transaction (the
contract for the sale of the Chevy S-10 pick-up) at trial. The Defendant will be
denied due process if the State is permitted to substitute transactions to sustain a
conviction over which there was no bind over. See e.g. Ortega, infra.
At the close of the evidence at the preliminary hearing, the magistrate
asked the prosecutor to clarify which transaction - the July 19th transaction with
Abplanalp or the July 30th transaction with the Fausetts - constituted the crime of
equity skimming:
THE COURT: This is an unusual statute, one we don't deal with...
I guess there's two ways that I could look at this. I
2

could look at the transaction - two transactions that
have been spoken of. One is the initial transaction
and the other one is the transaction that's been
spoken of, where there was an agreement to sell on
a car lot. Are you relying upon one to the exclusion
of the other or both of those?
MR. THOMAS: Well, I think the focus is that transfer of the Monte
Carlo's ownership to someone else while there was
an existing lien is where our THE COURT: That's your focus?
MR. THOMAS: Yeah.
THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure that's where we were.
Okay, you may address the issues.

(R. 132 at 43-44.)
Based on the prosecutor's clarification, the magistrate remarked, "I'm glad for the
explanation. You're focusing on the sale of the Monte Carlo." R. 132 at 45, and
then bound over only the July 30th transaction.
The State's argument on appeal that the bind over included the July 19th
transaction because the information included the range of dates would allow the
State to actively mislead the Defendant and the Court and thereby render the
protection of a preliminary hearing meaningless. In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d

3

778 (Utah 1980), the Court noted that one of the important purposes of a
preliminary hearing is providing the accused with the particulars of the nature of
the State's case. Indeed as early as 1908, the Supreme Court explained why the
preliminary hearing has become part of the fabric of criminal procedure in this
State:
To secure to the accused, before he is brought to the trial
under information, the right to be advised of the nature of
accusation against him . . . He is thus enabled, if he so
desires, to fully inform himself of the facts upon which the
State relies to sustain the charge made against him, and be
prepared to meet them at the trial.
State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 P. 1085, 1086 (1908).
The State committed to the July 30th transaction at the preliminary hearing.
The State cannot now be heard to revive the abandoned July 19th transaction.
When a crime is charged by information, the pleader "must have in mind a
particular transaction having the elements of time, place, and circumstance,
which transaction in his judgment is unlawful.. .." State v. Nelson, 176 P.860,
861 (Utah 1918). Also, see State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138,1139 (Utah 1988)
(variance between charge bound over and charge proven at trial necessitated
new trial because defendant deprived of preliminary hearing).
The State also claims that Marshall is assuming without basis that the
jurors convicted him for the July 19th transaction, and contends that the elements
4

instruction focusing the jurors on the equity skimming which allegedly occurred
"on or about July 19" was broad enough to include the July 30th transaction with
the Fausetts. State's brief at 16-18. This argument ignores that the only date
mentioned in the elements instruction was July 19, the transaction date with
Abplanalp, and not July 30th, the transaction date with the Fausetts. Moreover,
the court's final instruction to the jury which informed them of the possible
verdicts on the equity skimming count, gave the jurors the option of convicting or
acquitting Marshall for the "incident date July 19, 2002." (R. 151). The final
verdict likewise identified the date for the Equity Skimming charge as July 19,
2002 (R. 140)."1 The Court, through its instructions, directed the jury to consider
whether equity skimming occurred on July 19th, not July 30th and not the range of
dates contained in the information (July 19 to October 2002). This constellation
of instructions impels one to the ineluctable conclusion that the jury only
considered and convicted Mr. Marshall of equity skimming for the July 19th
transaction and not for the July 30th transaction.
This was clear to the trial court. In considering but ultimately denying the
Motion for a New Trial, Judge Payne noted:
"But I think it's clear to me that the evidence was presented
and the argument was made with respect to the violation of

iThe two relevant jury instructions and the final verdict are copied in the
addendum to this brief as A and B respectively.

5

the law occurring on the transfer on July 30th to Mr. and Mrs.
Fausett."
(R. 274 at 15.)
And later:
"It's interesting that, with respect to that in her argument, Ms.
Barton Coombs argument, she says that, There was no way
that the jury could have found him guilty of the offense as
occurring on July 19th.' And I believe that's correct. Now, I
don't think that anybody ever alleged that the transaction on
July 19th, which was actually a transaction that was
completed, I think on the 23rd of July, that there was never any
allegation that the law was violated at that time, and yet as I
keep coming back we have jury instructions which refer to that
date." (Emphasis added).
(R. 274 at 16-17.)
The State implicitly contends that because trial counsel assented to the
instructions which were given and did not object, the error was invited, and
should not be addressed on appeal. State's brief at 12-14. Just as parties may
not create jurisdiction by stipulation, they may not do so by incompetence. See,
e.g., Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company v. Smith, 2002 UT 49, U 5,48 P.3d
976 (parties may not confer jurisdiction by agreement). Assuming arguendo that
trial counsel did invite the error, this decision is still subject to review for objective
6

unreasonableness under the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine.
See, e.g., State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 1989) (consciously
chosen trial strategies are still reviewed for ineffective assistance).
The State does not address or refute Marshall's contention that trial
counsel's failure to object to his being tried and convicted for an offense in the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction, see Opening Brief of Appellant at 31-32,
and Marshall stands by that argument.
Because the jury instructions and verdict demonstrate that Marshall was
convicted for the July 19th transaction, which the State abandoned at preliminary
hearing , and for which he was not bound over, and for which there was no
jurisdiction, a new trial is required. See, Nelson, Ortega, supra.

II.

REVERSAL IS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
The State appears to believe that defeating an ineffective assistance claim

is limited only by the State's ability to characterize a defect as legitimate trial
strategy unfettered and unimpeded by resort to the record . Mr. Marshall submits
that the record evidence demonstrates unambiguously that there was no
reasonable consciously chosen strategy guiding trial counsel's deficiencies.
A.

Joinder of Cases
1.

Not a Conscious Strategy

The State contends that trial counsel properly moved to join the
misdemeanor counts of selling cars without a license with the felony equity
7

skimming count, as part of a reasonable strategy of showing the jurors that the
defense would own up to Marshall's true violations of the law, and thereby lend
credence to his defense to the felony charge of equity skimming. State's brief at
29-31. This is a fiction. Defense counsel had absolutely no strategy in mind.
How else does one make any sense of trial counsel's pointless objections (R.
267 at 15-17, 20-27, 29-31, 33-35, 36-39, 41, 43-50, 52-55) and multiple futile
questions trying to refute the fact that Marshall was a salesperson who should
have been licensed (R. 267 at 18-19, 21-22, 27-28, 32-33, 35, 39-41, 50-52).
Defense counsel's examination of the Defendant which revealed beyond all
doubt that he was guilty of being an unlicensed salesman proves the point that
there was no strategy guiding the defense. This was a rudderless ship. If it was
part of a strategy to convict on the lesser charges but acquit on the felony, it
would have at least been mentioned for an ephemeral moment to focus the jury's
attention on the Defendant's honest admission of his wrongdoing. Instead, the
four counts of unlicensed selling were never mentioned in either opening or
closing statements. Defense counsel did not concede Marshall's guilt of the
misdemeanor licensing violation (R. 267 at 8-10, R. 268 at 277-284) and it is
pure fiction to claim that joinder was a reasonable trial strategy.
2.

Objectively Unreasonable Assistance

Joinder of charges is governed by Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and U.C.A. § 77-8a-1. Rule 9.5 permits joinder when multiple
offenses arise from a single criminal episode. A single criminal episode is
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defined in U.C.A. § 76-1-401 as "all conduct which is closely related in time and
is incident to an attempt to an accomplishment of a single criminal objective."
The four different counts of Selling Without a License were not incident to an
attempt to accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
The same criminal episode statue specifically incorporates § 77-8a-1 in the
consideration of when offenses should be joined. The joinder statue only permits
the joinder of separate offenses in an information if the offenses are:
(a)

Based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected
together in their commission; of

(b)

Alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.

The selling of cars without a license was not part of the same scheme or
plan as the Equity Skimming arising from Mountain States Motors taking in Mr.
Abplanalp's 1996 Monte Carlo in trade for the sale of a 1999 Chevrolet S-10
pickup truck.
3.

Prejudice

In the instant matter, the prejudice to the Defendant cannot be
underestimated. Ms. Barton-Coombs made the affirmative motion to join the
Equity Skimming charge with four counts of Acting in Capacity Without a License
When Required charges. The introduction of the evidence relating to selling cars
without a license added to the impression the Defendant was unscrupulous and
not worthy of belief. The State would not have been permitted to introduce
evidence of the Defendant's commission of these offenses in the Equity

9

Skimming trial had the matters remain severed. The motion to join these
charges was a disastrous move by defense counsel and constituted deficient
representation. The prejudicial and inflammatory effect of the evidence
pertaining to the four Acting Without a License charges outweighed any probative
value it might have in relation to the Equity Skimming charge and defense
counsel should not have joined the four charges for which there was no defense
with the Equity Skimming charge.
B.

Failing to Cross-Examine Abplanalp on Prior Inconsistent
Statements.

The State contends that this Court should strike the footnotes in this
argument from Marshall's opening brief, and then abstain from reaching the
merits of the issue for inadequate briefing. The State suggests that counsel for
Marshall jammed the necessary facts into the footnotes to evade the page
limitations of rule 24. State's brief at 34-35.
Review of Marshall's opening brief confirms that the substance of the
contents of each of the footnotes in question first appears in the double-spaced
text of the statement of facts.2 In repeating the facts in the footnotes, counsel for
Marshall was not trying to evade the page limitations of rule 24, but was
complying with the obligation of citing to the record, and reminding the Court of

2The substance of footnote 16 first appears in the second full paragraph of page
8. The substance of footnote 17 first appears in the second full paragraph on
page 20. The substance of footnote 18 first appears in the second full paragraph
of page 19.
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the pertinent facts from the statement of facts. The State's objection should be
eschewed.
The evidence presented a credibility contest between Mr. Abplanalp, a 19year-old teenager at the time of the transaction, and the Defendant, a used car
salesman. Precisely what Mr. Marshall said to Mr. Abplanalp at the time that the
contract for the purchase of the Chevy S-10 pick-up was signed by Abplanalp
was pivotal to the jury's determination. Convincing the jury that Mr. Abplanalp
had assumed something different from what the documents actually said and
what Mr. Marshall said to Mr. Abplanalp during the transaction, were necessary
and essential strategy to an acquittal.
The State argued in closing argument that Mr. Marshall made material
misrepresentations to Mr. Abplanalp about who would pay off the lien on the
Monte Carlo being traded to the car dealership. (R. 268 at 289). The buyer
changed his story and key details pertaining to the alleged misrepresentations
made by Mr. Marshall. These inconsistencies went unchallenged by defense
counsel. The failure to demonstrate for the jury Mr. Abplanalp's inconsistent
testimony on these key points is inexcusable and cannot be condoned with the
State's label of reasonable trial strategy.
The State takes the position that Abplanalp's preliminary hearing and trial
testimony were consistent in reflecting Abplanalp's contention that Marshall told
him that the zero on the payoff line on the S-10 sales contract meant that the
dealership would pay off the balance on the Monte Carlo. State's brief at 36,
11

citing R. 132 at 9-12; R. 267 at 60, 63-64, 67, R. 268 at 258, 262. The State is
again wrong.
By reviewing the pages of the preliminary hearing transcript cited by the
State plus three more, this Court will confirm that at the preliminary hearing,
Abplanalp testified that Marshall did not say who would pay off the lien or discuss
the zero on the payoff line in the sales contract at the time of the sale, but did tell
Abplanalp sometime later when Abplanalp realized that the Monte Carlo had not
been paid off that "had he put a different number, then he would have been
responsible - or I would have been responsible." (R. 132 at 9-14,19). He
maintained that his expectation that the dealership would pay off the Monte Carlo
was premised on his "common sense" assumption and on Abplanalp's inability to
pay for both the car and the truck (R. 132 at 9-14,19); but not on any
misrepresentation of Mr. Marshall.
When Abplanalp answered defense counsel's questions at trial that
Marshall told him the dealership would pay off the Monte Carlo and had him fill
out an authorization for payoff form to facilitate doing so (R. 268 at 258-262), trial
counsel should have immediately impeached the witness with his prior sworn
testimony at the preliminary hearing that he and Marshall did not discuss who
would pay off the loan, that Abplanalp did not sign any papers with regard to that
issue, and that Abplanalp only assumed that Mountain States would pay off the
Monte Carlo (R. 132 at 9-120,12-14, 19). This was a key opportunity to destroy

12

Abplanalp's credibility missed by defense counsel. Rather than torn asunder, the
witness escaped unscathed, unruffled, and with his credibility fully in tact.
Al II ii1 | in'In i in MI v In MI ii n | mi M.n i 11 ,'»i, ','()()'•$, tin1 prnst-'Tiitoi ,iskeil Mr.
Abplanalp a series of leading questions about who Mr. Marshall said would pay
the outstanding lien on the Monte Carlo. Mr. Abplanalp did not follow the
proMountain States would pay off the Monte Carlo. The following dialogue occurred
during the prosecutor's direct examination of the witness:
C.i Ml i,

iinl i HI h II iinl iHI "^i n innIt i MIIII impressio

somebody else was going to pay that off [$3,500 lien].
A: I was.
C
A: That's just what I expect the dealer to do when I trade a
vehicle in, is to actually take care of the lien at the bank.
(Emphasis added.)
v^.

i

< '

I

Q. Ukiy, ami why did you expect the dealer to take care of the lien?
Was that part of your negotiated agreement with Mr. Marshall?
A: Any other vehicle I've looked at, that's part of the negotiations.
Q: Okay, and in this particular case is it fair to say that because you
had told him there was a lien i
13

""•

i

would expect that Mountain States would in fact take care of that
lien?
MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Objection, your Honor. Leading.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q: Is there - can you explain to the Court in your own words why it
was that you felt like Mountain States would take care of that lien.
A: Because I had traded the vehicle into their possession and the
whole point of trading the vehicle in is to get the one you've paid
off, so that you can take care of the other payment.
(R. 132 at 14.)
Mr. Abplanalp also made it perfectly clear in his preliminary hearing
testimony that he had not paid any attention to or bothered to read the sales
contract which contained a zero balance on line 11 corresponding to the existing
lien. (Plaintiffs Ex. 3).
Q. Had you looked at that before?
A. I had not.
(R. 132 at 15.)
Also at the preliminary hearing defense counsel asked Mr. Abplanalp
about his understanding of who would pay the lien to Mountain America Credit
Union at the time the contract formation with the sale of the S-10 pick-up.
According to Mr. Abplanalp, there was no conversation about who would pay the
outstanding lien:
14

Q: And at that time did you discuss specifically who was going to
pay
A. We did not.
This preliminary hearing testimony was decidedly different from Mr.
Abplanalp's testimony at trial where he testified unequivocally that Mr. Marshall
told him that Mountain States Motors would pay off the outstanding lien on the
Monte Carlo. R. 268 at 258, 261, 266, 267. This misrepresentation was central
to the State's closing argument that Mr. Marshall was guilty of Equity Skimming.
("Mr. Marshall represented to Mr. Abplanalp that he \

*^

Mountain America." R. 268 at 289.)
The State also claims that there was no inconsistency by Abplanalp
regarding the-' rum M ml lie hdh'veil he IUHMIPM In |

' Slate's In id , il

39. This is not true. By reviewing page 267 of his testimony, and page 109 of
Shelly Sorenson's testimony, the Court can confirm that Abplanalp did apply for a
loan in the amount of $10, 918.35
268 at 267, R. 267 at 109). In contrast, the Court can see that on page 265 of
his testimony, he claimed that he did not know he needed some $900 more than
$10
the check (R. 268 at 265).
The State is correct that there was no inconsistency in Abplanalp's
tostinn my II (| inlnni In i in in, pliinic i ill In in nli
apologizes for misreading the record.

i i mil d lm I' I n lull

Impeaching Abplanalp's credibility was key to an acquittal. His testimony
changed from assuming the dealership would pay off the credit union lien at the
preliminary hearing to an unequivocal accusation that Mr. Marshall represented
that Mountain States would pay it at trial. Failure to impeach the witness with his
prior inconsistent testimony fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome
had trial counsel done so.
C.

Odometer Fraud.

With regard to the odometer fraud evidence, the State again complains
that counsel for Marshall put the facts in the footnotes to evade the Court's page
limitation. State's brief at 39-40.
As was true of the other footnotes the State seeks to strike, the footnotes
pertaining to the odometer fraud argument merely repeat the facts which appear
double spaced earlier in the brief.3 In repeating the facts in the footnotes,
counsel complies with the requirement of citing to the record and reminds the
Court of previously stated facts which are pertinent to the specific argument.
The State claims that trial counsel was acting on valid trial strategy in
proving that odometer fraud was normal at the dealership where Marshall
worked, in order to insulate Marshall from the prosecutor's proof that the

3"The substance of footnote 19 appears in the second full paragraph of page 13.
The substance of footnote 20 appears in the third full paragraph on page 14.
The substance of footnote 21 appears in the second full paragraph on page 18.
The substance of footnote 22 appears in the first full paragraph on page 19.
16

odometer statement for the S-10 was fraudulent. State's brief at 41. The record
counters this theory.

roved that the organization that

employed Marshall and several other defense witnesses engaged in fraud as a
matter of course, but also submitted additional proof that the S-10 odometer
statement was fraudulent, without submitting any proof that Marshall had nothing
to do with

268 at 252-53,

1263-64).

Contrary to the State's argument that counsel for Marshall is
misrepresenting the record, the record demonstrates that trial counsel did submit
into evidence thf odometer statei
testimony that the statement was accurate (R. 268 at 263-64), and this did prove
odometer fraud, because when the dealership received the truck, the mileage
w;i'i,il V? fVin iinl lln i nil mii'li i I IIMIII nl imln .ili'il mill ,U|(MII X'DM) ind
thus clearly did not reflect the roughly three hundred and fifty miles that
Sprouse's wife drove the truck before Abplanalp bought it (R. 268 at 194-96,
199). This
was not a reasonable strategy to admit this evidence. The State's suggestion
that this was sound trial strategy is unfounded. See State's brief at 43.
The State <
on Abplanalp to produce clear title to the car within forty-eight hours, this may
have backfired on Marshall, because the jurors may have found him at fault for
;.. i brief at
43-44. The jurors did find Marshall at fault for not insuring the clear title to the
17

car when it convicted him of equity skimming. Submitting proof that supported
the defense and dealership's position that Abplanalp had a legal duty to clear the
title was fully consistent with and helpful to the defense.
The State repeats its argument assailing the briefing on the issue of
prejudice. State's brief at 45-46. As noted above, Marshall's prejudice
argument, which applies to all claims of error in the case, first appears at pages
29 through 31 of the opening brief.4 It is summarized, repeated and/or referred
back to in the brief. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 38-40 and 49-50. 5 Given
the thorough statement facts provided at pages 6 through 20 of the opening brief,
which details the strengths and weaknesses of the State's case, the prejudice
arguments accurately and adequately explain why, in the evidentiary context of
this case, the errors require reversal.
D.

Payoff Authorization Form.

In its statement of facts, the State contends, "Abplanalp was familiar with
the pay off authorization form and was able to describe the size (8.5" x 3") and
color of the document before seeing it in court (R. 132:19; pi's exh. 6)." State's
brief at page 6.

4|n referring back to this prejudice argument in the opening brief, counsel
erroneously cited to pages 30 and 31, and omitted reference to page 29.
5

lt is standard appellate practice to refer back to arguments which apply multiple
times in briefs, in lieu of repeating them over and over. See State's brief at 41
(referring the Court to a previous argument the State wishes to raise again
without repeating in full).

18

By turning to the addendum of this brief, this Court can confirm that page
19 of R. 132 is the preliminary hearing transcript, wherein Abplanalp testified
that he did not sign ;in .'iiithorizntiiin lui II.IVMII limn

11M-» St;-Hi•

mischaracterized his testimony about color and dimension. His only testimony
describing a paper was this: "I signed a little paper releasing the title to Mountain
States Motor."
In its argument, the State does not acknowledge that Abplanalp testified at
the preliminary hearing that he did not sign an authorization for payoff form (R.
1'

testified to having signed it (R.

267: 62, 76). He went so far as to describe the unusual size and the color nl II w <
form on the first day of trial (id.)." State's brief at 33.
can confirm that on
pages 62 and 76 of Abplanalp's trial testimony, he did not describe the
unusual color of the form. On page 62, he claimed to have signed a title
rr 'ledsc , IJI id explained

believed that the dealership would pay off the

Monte Carlo because it was "just pretty much common sense when yni i 11, i<!< • in
a vehicle you're trading it in to get it paid off and get a newer vehicle." (R. 267 at
jefense counsel identified the authorization for payoff form
as white, and gave Abplanalp a blank one, leading him to testify that
signed such a form (R. 267 at 76).

The State's description of Abplanalp's

pay-off authorization form is simply not accurate.
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Trial counsel's presentation of a blank form to Abplanalp at trial to support
his trial testimony that he signed such a form combined with trial counsel's failure
to present sufficient foundation to admit his file to show that it contained no such
form was objectively deficient. This deficiency was particularly harmful and
indefensible in light of his failure to cross-examine Abplanalp with his preliminary
hearing testimony that he did not sign an authorization pay-off form (R. 132 at
19).

III.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRES REVERSAL.
The State argues that the prosecutor was accurate in arguing that Shelly

Sorenson testified that credit union employees do not worry about the payoff
amount line on car sales contracts. State's brief at 21, citing to R. 267:106.
If the Court will turn to the addendum to this brief, the Court can confirm
that on pages 105 and 106, Sorenson testified that the credit union employees
do not worry about that part of the transaction in cases in which the sales
contract does not mention a payoff amount; but she did not testify that they
routinely disregard the portion of contracts specifying who would pay off their
liens (R. 267 at 105-106). Shelly Sorenson testified that most of the time, it is
specified in the contracts when dealerships are going to make payoffs (R. 267 at
105), tacitly acknowledging that she does pay attention to that line in the
contract.
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The State claims that Marshall misrepresents the focus of the prosecutor's
argument

1 .Ule'\ h i " l .il.'.'

Mi'.1 im oul confirms that the prosecutor used

Shelly Sorenson's supposed but non-existent testimony that credit •
the payoff line in contracts to bolster Abplanalp's testimony that Mountain States
v\

apposed

car, even though the plain language of the contract

he signed indicated that there was zero balan
at 287.
The State argues that the prosecutor properly argued that Marshall told
Abplanalp that "it would be better" if he

i.' iI. ilet,,, n <
i I

that the jurors could almost infer that this was proof of Marshall's attempt to hide
the transaction (R. 268 at *

State's brief at 23. In so arguing, the State

presents the testimn

P

the truck through Mountain states, and then apparently infers from the testimony
< nese two men that Marshall made the offer to finance twice. State's brief at
?3.
There is nothing to indicate that Marshall made two offers to finance the
truck, and nothing to support the prosecutor's argument that it was almost proper
to infer that Marshall vvm, HinHiy liyin<i In linlc lir. minimis ilmil

I n Hie

contrary, because the Monte Carlo was not of value to the dealership until the
title was clear, Marshall had no incentive to make or hide a deal in which no one
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The State condones as a reasonable interpretation of the evidence the
prosecutor's argument that Marshall was lying about Abplanalp's responsibility to
pay off the Monte Carlo, because Marshall claimed to be relying on Abplanalp's
oral commitment to do so, in contradistinction to Marshall's reliance on the
written contract for Abplanalp to borrow and pay back the final $918.35. State's
brief at 25.
The prosecutor's juxtaposition of the contract for $918.35, with his
repeated argument that in contrast, Marshall was claiming that he was relying on
nothing but Abplanalp's word regarding the payoff, was not a reasonable
interpretation of the evidence. It was disingenuous and misleading, given that
the contract Abplanalp signed reflected that no balance was owed on the Monte
Carlo, and given Marshall's repeated testimony that he was relying on that
contract for Abplanalp to pay off the Monte Carlo (R. 268 at 233, 235, 240-43).
The State claims that Marshall's prejudice argument is cumulative and
inadequate. State's brief at 27.
Marshall's prejudice argument, which applies to all claims of error in the
case, first appears at pages 29 through 31 of the opening brief. 6 It is
summarized, repeated and/or referred back to in the brief. See Opening Brief of

6|n referring back to this prejudice argument in the opening brief, counsel
erroneously cited to pages 30 and 31, and omitted reference to page 29.
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Appellant at 38-40 and 49-507 Given the thorr , |l, ,1 ,K;,nciil l,K',t.\ [i,.tvul<ul .il
pages 6 through 20 of the opening brief, which details the strengths and
weaknesses ul II it? State's case, the prejudice arguments accurately and
adequately explain

/identian

reversal.
The State does not contest that it has the burden of proving the
prosecutorial misi. i ii I i II

I,1!

Ivyni.1,,1 , r.on.il l*j JULJLI

I

make any

effort to shoulder this burden. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 37. Because
the prosecutorial misconduct probably influenced the verdict, and deprived
Marsh; ill ul i I HI hi il in

In il i in i l n

\<c oLtt . , roy, 688 P.2d 483,

486 (Utah 1984).

7

lt is standard appellate practice to refer back to arguments which apply multiple
times in briefs, in lieu of repeating them over and over. See State's brief at 41
(referring the Court to a previous argument the State wishes to raise again
without repeating in full).
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Mr. Marshall's convictions and remand this
matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing law.
Respectfully submitted this ^ I V d a y of December, 2004.

BUGDEN & ISAACSON, L L C .

By: l A o i i ^ T . R
ENT^R.(
WALTER F. BUGDE
TARA L. ISAACSON
ELIZABETH HUNT
Attorneys for Appellant
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served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by first class U S mail to the
followingKris C. Leonard
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City I IT R4114

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

Proof of the commission of the crime of Equity Skimming, requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the following elements
of that crime:
1.

That Dustin Marshall;

2.

On or about July 19, 2 002

3.

Did as a dealer or broker;

4.

Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly;
a.

Transferred or arranged the transfer of a vehicle for

consideration or profit;
5.

When he knew or should have known the vehicle was subject
to a security interest;

6.

Without first obtaining written authorization of the holder
of the security interest.
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IV/l

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

JI ?

When you retire to deliberate, you will

select one of your

members as foreman who will preside over your deliberations.

Your

verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreman, and when found
must be returned to you into this Court.
Your verdict must be either:
1.

Guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN REQUIRED

relating to Count I, incident date of July 9, 2002, as charged in
the Information.
2.

Not

guilty

of ACTING

IN CAPACITY WITHOUT

LICENSE WHEN

REQUIRED relating to Count I, incident date of July 9, 2002, as
charged in the Information.
3.

Guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN REQUIRED

relating to Count II, incident date of July 18, 2002, as charged in
the Information.
4.

Not guilty

of ACTING

IN CAPACITY

WITHOUT

LICENSE WHEN

REQUIRED relating to Count II, incident date of July 18, 2002, as
charged in the Information.
5.

Guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN REQUIRED

relating to Count III, incident date of July 19, 2002, as charged
in the Information.
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6.

Not

guilty of ACTING

IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN

REQUIRED relating to Count III, incident date of July 19, 2002, as
charged in the Information.
7.

Guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN REQUIRED

relating to Count IV, incident date of August 3, 2002, as charged
in the Information.
8.

Not

guilty of ACTING

IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN

REQUIRED relating to Count IV, incident date of August 3, 2002, as
charged in the Information.
9.

Guilty of EQUITY SKIMMING as charged in a separate criminal

Information, date* July 19, 2002.
10.

Not guilty of EQUITY SKIMMING as charged in a separate

criminal Information, dated July 19, 2002.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

V E R D I C T

vs.
CASE NO.

DUSTIN MARSHALL,

021800313
031800019

Defendant.
We, the Jury impaneled in the above-entitled cause, find the
Defendant, DUSTIN MARSHALL, guilty of EQUITY SKIMMING as charged in
a separate criminal Information dated July 19, 2002.
DATED this

tf

day of A <+£>>

, 2003.

FOREMAN
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-19car; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recall specifically if you told anyone how much

that lien was?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Who did you tell specifically how much that lien was?

A.

It was Dusty Marshall.
THE COURT: Now, we're talking about the time

Q.

—

BY MS. BARTON-COOMBS: At the time of the forming of

the contract, when you were negotiating to buy this pick-up?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And at that time did you discuss specifically who was

going to pay that lien off?
A.

We did not.

Q.

Did you sign any documents with Mountain States Motor

or Mr. Marshall considering —

concerning the lien at Mountain

America giving them authorization for a payoff or allowing them
contact with the bank to make that payoff?
A.

I signed a little paper releasing the title to

Mountain States Motor.
Q.

Okay, that didn't answer my question.

Did you sign a

paper authorizing Mountain States Motor to talk with Mountain
America about the amount of your lien, the payoff amount or
authorizing them to pay that off?
A.

No, I did not.
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-62Q.

Okay.

Now, moving onto this information concerning

the trade in or the amount owed to Mountain America, you said
that it never really came up until you brought the $10,000
check.
Can you explain to the jury what happened then, or what your
conversation —

who did you bring the check to and what was

your conversation?
A.

After I left Mountain America I brang the check and

handed it to Dusty Marshall.
to go.

They already had the S-10 ready

They had the temporary permits on it and everything,

and I gave the check to him, and I said the title's ready for
them whenever they go get it.
Q.

Okay.

A.

You know, I had told Mountain America that Mountain

States would be coming to get the title.
Q.

Okay.

A.

And I just told them that when they go get the title

they can, and I then signed a title release.
Q.

Okay, and did you tell them that you had paid the

Monte Carlo off?
A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Okay.

Why is it —

can you help the jury understand

why is it you believe that the Monte Carlo would be paid off?
A.

Because it's just pretty much common sense when you

trade in a vehicle you're trading it in to get it paid off and
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-76Honor?
THE COURT: Would you like that marked as an exhibit?
MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Not at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may.
Q.

BY MS. BARTON-COOMB S: Mr. Abplanalp, have you ever

seen anything like this white form that I've just handed you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

When did you see one of those?

A.

When I took the $10,000 to Dusty Marshall.

Q.

Is this what you're saying you filled out?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What is that document called?

A.

It says, "Authorization for payoff."

Q.

Okay.

So when you talk about a title release, is this

the document you're referring to?
A.

Yes.

I didn't know the exact name for it'V

Q.

Okay.

Did you sign any other documents?

A.

Not pertaining to the title I didn't.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I just signed the loan agreement at Mountain America

and that's all I signed.
Q.

For the $918?

A.

I signed that at Mountain States.

Q.

Okay, but you did sign another note for the $918?

A.

Yes, I did.
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